Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2

Article 8

Indigenous Peoples' Rights At The Intersection of
Human Rights And Intellectual Property Rights
Chidi Oguamanam

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Repository Citation
Chidi Oguamanam, Indigenous Peoples' Rights At The Intersection of Human Rights And Intellectual Property Rights, 18 Marq. Intellectual
Property L. Rev. 261 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol18/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

ARTICLES

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AT THE
INTERSECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
CHIDI OGUAMANAM*
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 265
I. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS FRAMEWORK ................................................................. 267
A. Beyond Human Rights ......................................................... 269
B. Three Convenient Frameworks for Indigenous Rights ........ 270
1. The International Bill of Rights ..................................... 271
2. Specific Treaty Instruments ........................................... 272
3. Recent Developments – UNDRIP ................................. 277
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ............... 280
III. MAPPING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS ONTO HRS-IPRS INTERFACE ........ 290
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 295

* Professor, Faculty of Law (Common Law), University of Ottawa. This article was inspired
during the author’s participation in a book panel for the presentation of Human Rights and Intellectual
Property: Mapping the Global Interface by Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme W. Austin on October 28,
2011, courtesy of the Duke University Center for International and Comparative Law and Center for
the Study of the Public Domain, Durham, NC. Thanks to all the members of the panel and to Professors
Helfer and Austin for their insights and for extending to the author the opportunity to participate at the
event. The author thanks Attila H. Rezaie for dedicated research assistance.

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

262

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

[Vol. 18:2

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

263

CHIDI OGUAMANAM

Professor Chidi Oguamanam obtained his foundational legal training in
Nigeria before completing his LL.M and Ph.D. degrees at the University of
British Columbia in Vancouver. He is called to the Bar in Nigeria and Canada
and he is a faculty at the Centre for Law, Technology and Society and the
Centre for Environmental Law and Global Sustainability at the University of
Ottawa. Formerly the Director of the Law and Technology Institute in the
Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University, Professor Oguamanam
belongs to diverse international research and professional networks committed
to building bridges and influencing policies across the south-south and northsouth geopolitical divides. His practice and research interests focus on various
legal and policy issue-linkages to intellectual property law, especially in the
areas of biotechnology, biodiversity, genetic resources, pharmaceuticals,
agricultural knowledge systems, food security and food systems; public health
law and policy; indigenous peoples, indigenous knowledge; human rights and
the global governance of knowledge in development contexts. He consults for
diverse environmental and indigenous groups, governance and public policy
think-tanks, NGOs, and intergovernmental and regional organizations. Widely
published in law and interdisciplinary platforms, he is the author of
International Law and Indigenous Knowledge (University of Toronto, 2006),
Intellectual Property in Global Governance (Routledge, 2012) and co-editor of
Innovation and Intellectual Property: Collaborative Dynamics in Africa
(University of Cape Town, 2013), and Knowledge and Innovation in Africa:
Scenarios for the Future (Cape Town: Open African Innovation, 2014).

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

264

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

[Vol. 18:2

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

265

INTRODUCTION
Dedicated exploration of the interface between human rights (HRs) and
intellectual property rights (IPRs or IP) is a venture still in its gestational stage.
Early outcomes of the conversations seem to agree on a few first impressions.
First, even though HRs and IPRs developed along different paths, the
foundation of their underexplored intersection is historically rooted.1 Second,
the development of both legal domains is influenced by the same historical
factors; such as the industrial revolution and the expansion of international
trade, which were catalysts for social, political, and economic transformations.2
Third, at no time has the empirical importance of the relationship between HRs
and IPRs been more palpable than the period beginning in the mid-1990s, and
symbolized by the coming into effect of the Trade-Related Agreement on
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).3
Fourth, as a conjecture, the normative outlook of the relationship between
HRs and IPRs is clouded by complex paradoxes and are allergic to simple
resolution. On the face of it, HRs cater to the optimal realization of human
potential; while intellectual creativity, which is the concern of IP, is integral to
realization of human capability and progress. Fifth, early enthusiasts of this
important conversation have a historic opportunity to frame and influence the
understanding of a subject matter that is developing at the pace of its equally
growing relevance.4 In that expectation, the mapping of indigenous peoples’
rights onto the interface between HRs and IP is a critical aspect of the ongoing
conversation. However, present attempts to explore the interface of broader
HRs jurisprudence with its IPRs counterpart reveal apparent conceptual
obfuscation in regard to how indigenous peoples’ rights are implicated.
The extent to which indigenous peoples’ rights are integrated into core HRs
instruments, especially the international bill of rights (IBRs)5 and other

1. See WILLEM GROSHEIDE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX
(Willem Grosheide, ed., 2010) [hereinafter Grosheide Paradox].
2. Grosheide argues that both IP and HRs developed in the coincidental contexts of industrial
revolution in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the resulting expansion in
international trade by technologically advanced countries. WILLEM GROSHEIDE, General Introduction,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 3, 4–5 (Willem Grosheide, ed., 2010)
[hereinafter Grosheide Introduction].
3. See Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property
Protection, 5 J. INTELL. ECON. L. 861, 870–71 (2002).
4. For perspective on the increasing imperative to explore HRs implications of IP, see generally
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045
(2012).
5. The IBR refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols made
under the last two. See generally UNDHR, infra note 30; CESCR, infra note 31; CCPR, infra note 32.
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international or regional HRs instruments is not apparent; and is at best
peripheral. Similarly, the status of indigenous peoples’ rights—as “group” or
“collective rights”—continues to pose normative challenges to HRs
jurisprudence, which evolved, in part, as a counterpoise to group tyranny.6
Perhaps, more important, as an aggregation of rights, indigenous peoples’ rights
constitute analogous misfits to any specific head of conventional HRs or IPRs.
Put differently, as opposed to paralleling any specific class of HRs, indigenous
peoples’ rights are complementary components of virtually every conventional
HR category;7 the same is true, to some degree, in relation to conventional
categories of IPRs.
Indigenous peoples’ rights, especially those relating to their knowledge
systems; continue to be treated with disdain under the conventional IP system.
Indigenous peoples’ attitude towards the IP system remains dialectical. As
summarized by analysts, “[a]ssertions of rights by indigenous peoples in the
context of intellectual property encompass two distinct and opposing
elements—claims to intellectual property protection, and claims to be protected
from intellectual property laws and institutions.”8 Given the inability of IPRs
to account for indigenous knowledge, let alone indigenous peoples’ rights, it is
logical to look to HRs to fill the gaps in IPRs in these areas.
The evolution and details of indigenous peoples’ rights within HRs theory
remains a work in progress. Rather than being a fait accompli, indigenous
peoples’ rights are part of the inchoate, yet progressive elaboration of
indigenous issues within HRs jurisprudence. Even if there is a merit in
exploring indigenous peoples’ rights from a HRs framework, as a process and
a state of affair, those rights are sources of irritation on traditional HRs
jurisprudence. Substantiating indigenous peoples’ rights within the HRs
paradigm remains an arduous task.
Finally, beyond the IBRs, the elements of indigenous peoples’ rights are
scattered in varying degree of emphasis and details across innumerable
international legal instruments of varying juridical status. Within this complex
and open-ended framework of indigenous peoples’ rights, charting them onto
conventional HRs categories remains problematic.
As its primary objective, this article attempts to contribute to an improved
understanding of the complex nature of indigenous peoples’ rights. It focuses

6. See Peter Jones, Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 80, 82
(1999).
7. There is hardly a specific head of human rights under international human rights instruments
in which indigenous people’s right as vulnerable groups are not implicated.
8. See LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 461 (2011).
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on how the latter are implicated in the contemporary discourse on HRs and
IPRs, and highlights conceptual and analytical challenges invoked by the
concept of indigenous peoples’ rights within the HRs-IPRs interface.
Indigenous peoples’ rights, it is argued, constitute critical components of
the HRs-IP interface. There is a need to unveil the conceptual obfuscation of
indigenous peoples’ rights in the context of contemporary interests in the
articulation of the nature of the increasingly emergent interaction of HRs with
IPRs. Hopefully, such an attempt will illuminate the complexly layered nature
of this trilogy of rights, and assist all stakeholders to approach these subject
matters with reflection. Without this kind of introspection, it is easy to
perpetuate the historical marginalization of indigenous peoples’ rights. To do
so squanders the prospect for a rejuvenation of indigenous peoples’ rights
discourse now opportune by the current interest in HRs’ relationship with IP.
Excluding the present introduction and the concluding outline, this article
is divided into three parts. Part I explores the evolution and nature of
indigenous peoples’ rights within the core HRs instruments and highlights the
extent of their marginalization under that framework. It also examines recent
iterations of indigenous peoples’ rights, identifies the pivotal elements of those
rights and their implication for HRs-IPRs interface. Part II outlines the tenor
of the discourse on the convergence of HRs and IPRs, and the peripheral
treatment of indigenous peoples’ rights in that context. It highlights fairly
recent interpretive accommodation of aspects of indigenous rights in tertiary
HRs instruments. Part III outlines elements of the peculiar status of indigenous
peoples’ rights, which constitute conceptual hurdles to framing indigenous
rights at the intersection of HRs and IPRs.
I. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK
The unhelpful but lingering definitional imbroglio around “indigenous
peoples” will not detain us at this point.9 Rather, it serves our present purpose
to focus on the uncontested facts about the status of indigenous peoples. All
over the world, indigenous peoples rank at the base of most human
development indicators. They “are among the most economically destitute
members of the human family and have frequently experienced adverse
treatment, including forced assimilation, destruction of their cultures, racism,
loss of land and resources to colonizers, governments and commercial

9. See Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative
and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57 (1999); see also Chidi Oguamanam, Local
Knowledge as Trapped Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Culture, Power and Politics, 11 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 29, 37 (2008) [hereinafter Oguamanam 2008].
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entities.”10 In addition, most indigenous peoples are under continuing threat of
cultural asphyxiation, necessitating the struggle to realize their right to selfdetermination and to negotiate the control of their resources, innovation, and
knowledge systems.11
The evolutionary history of indigenous peoples’ rights has been articulated
elsewhere.12 However, it bears mentioning that the struggle for indigenous
peoples’ rights dates back to the earliest attempts to understand and resist the
colonial experience by victims, adversaries, and actors within and outside the
colonial process.13
Symbolically, how to deal with indigenous peoples shaped the contestation
between natural and positivist ideologies that characterize international law
jurisprudence. The resurgence of naturalist thinking, beginning in the late
nineteenth-century, forced a reconsideration of alternative political structures
to the Westphalia state model favoured by the positivist ideology. This
development gave a new understanding to tribal, kinship, and various
decentralized political configurations through which indigenous peoples related
to the colonial authorities via various forms of treaties.14 In addition, it paved
the way for modest accommodation of new actors in the international process
outside the traditional nation state.15 These new actors are mainly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, and
various civil society groups who opposed the degrading and inhuman treatment
of indigenous peoples.
The middle of the twentieth-century marked perhaps the most important
transformation in the development of international law. Enshrined in the
United Nations Charter, that transformation is anchored in the recognition of

10. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 432.
11. See Antony Taubman, Preface: Indigenous Innovation: New Dialogues, New Pathways, in
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT
(Peter Drahos and Susy Frankel, eds., 2012).
12. See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 15-72 (2d ed.
2004) [hereinafter Anaya 2004]. See generally Wiessner, supra note 9; Russel Lawrence Barsh,
Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L LAW 369 (1986).
13. See Anaya 2004, supra note 12; see also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
14. From an Austinian positivist mindset, only nation states were cable of entering into treaties
with one another; since international law was the law of nations. As such, there was no legal
significance to any treaties signed by indigenous peoples (as tribal, ethnic, sub-ethnic or kinship
entities) with colonial powers. In essence, the “positivist view denied any legal significance to treaties
entered into between indigenous peoples and the colonial powers.” See Chidi Oguamanam, Indigenous
Peoples and International Law: The Making of a Regime, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 348, 357 & n.23 (2004)
[hereinafter Oguamanam 2004].
15. This was championed by the United Nations through the progressive accommodation of
non-state actors in its processes.
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“peoples” as the bearers of inalienable HRs.16 Those rights exist as a result of
the humanity of peoples without regard to the nation state. The reconfiguration
was necessitated, in part, by the horrors of Nazi Germany, after which citizens
were no longer deemed to owe their HRs to the whims and caprice of the nation
state.17 Rather, the latter had both positive and negative obligations to prevent
the violation of HRs of peoples.
The controversy over the appropriate approach to dealing with indigenous
peoples was instrumental to the evolution of international law, and international
HRs jurisprudence in particular.18 Ironically, however, international HRs
instruments shied away from making prescriptions in regard to indigenous
peoples in any direct sense, at least at the foundational stage under the IBRs.
Even though HRs were rights that accrued to “all peoples,” the “peopleness” of
indigenous peoples could not be guaranteed. Indigenous peoples were for the
most part targets of selective, rather than automatic, application of HRs.19 In
the next section, we sketch the gradual integration of indigenous peoples into
the HRs discourse.
A. Beyond Human Rights
Indigenous peoples make several claims on international and domestic
processes. Those claims may be contingent upon the specific historical,
political, economic, social and cultural experiences of the indigenous peoples
and the international, regional, or domestic circumstance at any given point in
time. Many such claims may not have HRs elements in any direct way. For
the most part, however, given that violations or denials of indigenous peoples’
HRs are at the core of their experience with colonial powers, HRs have shaped
and will continue to shape indigenous claims for a number of reasons.20
The urgency of HRs resonates more with disadvantaged and marginalized
members of the human family.21 Accordingly, indigenous peoples represent

16. U.N. Charter art I.
17. See Keith D. Nunes, “We Can Do . . . Better”: Rights of Singular Peoples and the United
Nations Draft Declaration on the “Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 521, 549
(1995).
18. See generally Anaya 2004, supra note 12; S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2009) [hereinafter Anaya 2009].
19. For example, while self-determination was a principal premise for granting independence
to colonial outposts outside the enclave territories, indigenous peoples of the enclave territories were
denied the right to political self-determination despite the affirmation of that right in core HRs
instruments.
20. See Anaya 2009, supra note 18.
21. See Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Econ. & Soc. Council, Rep. on its 25th, 26th,
& 27th Sess., Annex XIII, ¶¶ 4, 8, U.N. Doc. E/2002/22, Supp. No. 2 (2002); see also Philippe Cullet,
Human Rights and Intellectual Property Protection in the TRIPS Era, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 403, 415 n.48
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the mirror for viewing the progress of HRs. Similarly, scholars22 agree that
diverse subjects, including racial discrimination, self-determination, cultural
and minority rights, labour right, environmental rights and, lately, access to
knowledge, and resource control implicate aspects of HRs which now
constitute “the launching pad for an indigenous renaissance in contemporary
international law.”23
According to Kingsbury, diverse claims by indigenous peoples may not
necessarily lend themselves to neat categorization.24 He counsels that as a
genre, indigenous claims cannot and should not be pigeonholed into one fixed
exclusive human or non-human rights category.25 Despite, locating indigenous
peoples claims mainly within the international HRs framework, we must not
presume that the framework adequately addresses indigenous peoples’ rights.
As it will become clear shortly, “the peculiar problems facing indigenous
peoples required more than a shift in emphasis from the general human rights
framework to a focus on specific indigenous issues.”26
B. Three Convenient Frameworks for Indigenous Rights
For analytical convenience, we identify three convenient frameworks for
exploring the extent of accommodation of indigenous peoples within the
international HRs framework. The first is through the IBRs,27 the principal and
foundational HRs instruments of the United Nations. The second is through
specific treaty instruments with variegated degrees of interest in indigenous
peoples’ rights.28 The third is through recent soft law and miscellaneous
instruments that reiterate or synthesize the international consensus on
indigenous peoples’ rights within and beyond the HRs framework.29
(2007).
22. See Douglas Sanders, The Re-Emergence of Indigenous Question in International Law,
1983 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3 (1983); Benedict Kingsbury, Self-Determination and “Indigenous
Peoples”, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 383 (1992); Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous
Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 127 (1991); Sigfried Wiessner,
Joining Control to Authority: The Hardened “Indigenous Norm”, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 301 (2000).
23. Oguamanam 2004, supra note 14, at 362.
24. See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189 (2001).
25. Id. at 202.
26. Oguamanam 2004, supra note 14, at 362 & n.47 (citing Barsh, supra note 12, at 378).
27. See supra note 5.
28. Virtually all HRs treaties have some bearing with indigenous peoples to the extent not only
that the treaties’ subject matters are relevant to specific indigenous issues but, perhaps more important,
because indigenous peoples are implicated in the treaty subject as the most vulnerable of the human
society.
29. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. See generally Anaya 2004, supra note
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1. The International Bill of Rights
The IBRs refer to the trio of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UNDHR)30 and its subsequent elaboration in two treaty texts, namely the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)31 and the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR),32 as well as the associated
optional protocols. In terms of history and raison d’être, the IBRs derive from
the Charter of the United Nations. There is a degree of harmony in the
languages of the Charter and the three constitutive documents of the IBRs.
However, comparatively, the CCPR provisions are specific statements of
negative obligations for state parties in the areas of civil and political rights of
citizens. Concerning those rights, signatory countries are committed to their
immediate implementation. There are fewer controversies on the provisions of
the CCPR among state parties despite the pro Cold-War-style ideological
tensions that characterized the negotiations of the IBRs.
In contrast, the CESCR contains a less precise and broader statement of
amorphous categories of mainly positive and realizable obligations for states in
the areas of economic, social, and cultural rights. The CESCR is an instrument
of pre-eminence in the area of indigenous rights, not necessarily because
indigenous peoples expectations are less problematic under the CCPR but,
perhaps, because the density of rights under the CESCR implicate a
corresponding concentration of indigenous claims. Moreover, the progressive
realization principle of CESCR seemed a more pragmatic approach to
indigenous rights in the context of then unfolding decolonization processes.
Based on the concept of universality of HRs, the IBRs emphatically extend
their protective provisions to33: all members of the human family; (all) peoples
of the United Nations; the human person; all peoples; all/every human being(s);
all individuals, everyone, etc. Clearly, from the texts of the IBRs, there is no
attempt to isolate indigenous peoples outside the general categories of human
beings as the exclusive targets of HRs. However, indigenous peoples are
implicated by inferences through prohibitions against diverse categories of
discrimination to which they have been historically subjected. These include

12, at 55–104.
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UNDHR].
31. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), [hereinafter CESCR].
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter CCPR].
33. The following words and phrases appear in the texts of the constitutive instruments of the
IBRs. See UNDHR, supra note 30; CESCR, supra note 31; CCPR, supra note 32; and the Optional
Protocols made under the last two.
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references to: race, equality, colour, language, religion, social origin, birth,
slavery and servitude, forced or compulsory labour, torture and other forms of
inhuman and degrading treatment.34
The indirect accommodation of indigenous peoples’ rights, albeit in
negative and non-exclusive terms under the IBRs, has had counterintuitive
effects. First, subsequent secondary elaborations of relevant provisions of the
IBRs have been more proactive in not only drawing indigenous peoples’ rights
into the ambit of IBR provisions, but also in fleshing out the practical
translations of those rights. For example, even though Article 27 of the CCPR
makes no reference to indigenous peoples,35 its reference to minorities has been
interpreted to include indigenous peoples.36
Similarly, in their interpretive elaboration of specific provisions of the
CESCR, through the general comments (GCs), the Committee on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights (the Committee or CESCR)37 has made direct
references to various forms of accommodation of indigenous peoples’ rights
within the ambit of the Covenant.38
2. Specific Treaty Instruments
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the institutional source of
two integral HRs treaties that directly addressed indigenous peoples’ rights.39
They are the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 1957 (No.
107)40 and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169).41
34. See, e.g., UNDHR, supra note 30, arts. 4, 5, 16, 18; CESCR, supra note 31, arts. 2, 7, 10;
CCPR, supra note 32, arts. 8, 18, 27.
35. CCPR, supra note 32, art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion,
or to use their own language.”).
36. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of
Minorities), Apr. 8, 1994, ¶ 3.2, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld
/category,LEGAL,,GENERAL,,453883fc0,0.html.
37. Part of the responsibility of this Committee of human rights experts is to interpret the
provision of the CESCR and to monitor and report on its implementations by state parties. In proving
guidance to the potential prescriptive details of the CESCR, the committee issues General Comments
on specific articles of the treaty. These comments do not have binding force, but they “serve as focal
points for change in national legal systems and provide a standard against which the Committee can
review states’ compliance with the Covenant.” See HRs Framework, infra note 80, at 988.
38. See infra notes 113–121 and accompanying texts.
39. See Anaya 2009, supra note 18, at 133.
40. See generally Convention No. 107, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no107/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 15, 2014)
[hereinafter Convention 107].
41. See generally Convention No. 169, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 15, 2014)
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Convention 107 “was a first attempt to codify international obligations of States
in respect [of] indigenous and tribal populations and was the first international
convention on the subject.”42 The treaty adopted an integrationist approach,
with the ultimate objective of annihilation of indigenous cultural practices,
identities and worldviews, to be replaced with those of the dominant western
colonial powers.
Subsequent global developments around indigenous policies resulted in the
rejection of the assimilation model.43 Rather, there was a policy shift toward
respect for ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism in a manner that raised hope
for eventual self-determination for indigenous peoples. This change in tone
was symbolized by Convention 169’s displacement of Convention 107.
The transition to Convention No. 169 created a few symbolic impressions.
First, negotiated on the heels of the IBRs, Convention 107 reflected the
dominant sentiments in regard to indigenous peoples at the time of the IBR
negotiations. Symbolically, as evident in its title, it refers to its subject matter
as populations as opposed to peoples. Arguably, construed as populations,
members of indigenous and tribal communities become equivocal subjects of
HRs protection in strict construction of the language of the IBRs discussed
above.
Convention 107 came at the peak of independence movements of most
colonized states. In this charged atmosphere of pro-independence movements,
it was not only self-serving but also politically prudent to not broach the idea
of self-determination for the surviving members of pre-colonial civilizations,
especially in the enclave territories. There was a fixation on external selfdetermination and its unpredictable consequences, notable among which is the
idea of end-state.
Third, despite symbolizing a change in the approach to dealing with
indigenous peoples, Convention 169 is not radical in regard to selfdetermination. In Article 1(3), it declares, “[t]he use of the term peoples in this
Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the
rights which may attach to the term under international law.”44 It is remarkable,
however, that “[w]hile many of the provisions [of Convention 169] are
consistent with the principle of self-determination the Convention does not
recognize this right as such.”45

[hereinafter Convention 169].
42. See Convention 107, supra note 40.
43. Anaya 2004, supra note 12, at 58.
44. Convention 169, supra note 41, art. 1(3).
45. See What are the Intellectual Property Related Rights of Indigenous Peoples and where are
they Discussed?, CALL OF THE EARTH LLAMO DE LA TIERRA, http://calloftheearth.wordpress.com/
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As problematic as they are, issues around the two concepts of peoples and
self-determination need not overshadow the important contributions of the ILO
on the development of indigenous peoples’ rights. Without question,
Convention 107 and its transmutation in Convention 169 are elaborate
statements of the rights of indigenous peoples. In a way, they focus on
indigenous-specific HRs46 on sui generis basis. Despite their low numbers of
ratification, the Conventions47 represent the most authoritative, albeit less
comprehensive,48 binding instrument on indigenous peoples’ rights. Along
with the IBRs, they provide part of the foundation for progressive elaboration
of these rights in subsequent instruments, notably the 2007 United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),49 to which we
shall turn shortly.
Like the ILO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) also champions the implementation of indigenous
peoples’ rights through various treaty instruments and development-oriented
programs.50 Given the symbiotic relationship between education, science, and
development, UNESCO is an important player in the promotion of HRs. It is
a strategic platform for the promotion of indigenous cultural rights (including
traditional cultural expression, expressions of folklore, intangible cultural
heritage, etc). It calls attention to the need for equity in the diffusion of global
cultural diversity.51

resourcesimportant-terms/what-are-the-intellectual-property-related-rights-of-indigenous-peoplesand-where-are-they-discussed/ [hereinafter Call of the Earth].
46. Anaya observes that the declaration elaborates on fundamental HRs “in the specific cultural,
historical, social and economic circumstances of indigenous peoples.” See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra
note 8, at 442. See generally REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds., 2011) [hereinafter Allen &
Xanthaki].
47. Upon the coming into effect of Convention No. 169, Convention No. 107 was withdrawn
for ratification purposes; but it remains in force in 18 countries. On the other hand, only 20 countries
at the time of writing this article have ratified Convention No. 169. See generally Convention 169,
supra note 41; Convention 107, supra note 40.
48. A few of the gaps in the ILO Conventions include their limited and less direct provisions
on the rights of indigenous peoples regarding cultural resources. In addition, the Conventions vest
much responsibilities on governments toward the realization of indigenous peoples’ aspirations. See
generally Call of the Earth, supra note 45.
49. Anaya notes that UNDRIP “is coherent with, and expands upon the provisions of ILO
Convention No. 169” among other international HRs instruments. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note
8, at 443 (citing 2008 Report on the Situation of HRs and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous at ¶
43).
50. There are seven treaty documents relevant to the subject of indigenous peoples’ rights. See
infra note 53.
51. See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Res. 15, U.N. Doc.
31 C/Res. 15 (Nov. 2, 2001). The declaration was the precursor to the Convention on the Protection
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As the “hub for international law and policy on culture,”52 UNESCO
represents the fusion of culture and knowledge, both of which are at the
intersection of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
The
53
organization is associated with seven important treaties dealing with different
aspects of culture in recognition of the pivotal importance of the latter to
indigenous peoples’ rights.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a special agency of
the United Nations, is primarily charged with the promotion of IPRs. Lately,
WIPO is attuned to navigate the challenges which indigenous knowledge poses
for the IP system. Compared to UNESCO, WIPO’s exposure to indigenous
peoples’ rights is not a direct factor of its enabling instrument, but an incidence
of the implementation of its mandate and administration of other treaties with
indirect impact on indigenous knowledge. Pursuant to that mandate, WIPO
views indigenous knowledge from the narrow lens of IPRs as opposed to HRs.
WIPO is therefore a major platform for the discussion of indigenous knowledge
issues. At present, it supervises indigenous knowledge issues through the
Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional (indigenous) Knowledge and Folklore. In the course of
over decade-long deliberations, the IGC is expected to produce comprehensive
treaties on the protection of various manifestations of traditional knowledge.
International environmental law instruments in their soft and hard law
renditions are yet another aggregate platform for promoting indigenous
peoples’ rights, especially those dealing with biological resources and
associated indigenous knowledge and environmental stewardship. A few of the
instruments include: The Rio Declaration; Agenda 21; the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD);54 the Forest Principles,55 and the Desertification

and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005).
52. CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE A
DEVELOPMENT QUESTION 184 (2012) [hereinafter IP in Global Governance].
53. They are the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, 2005, Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003, Convention
on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2001, Convention on the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972, Convention on Fighting Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural
Property, 1970, Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
1954 and the Convention on the Protection of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 1971.
54. Including all associated instruments, especially the 2010 Nagoya Protocol to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Feb. 2, 2011, https://www.cbd.int/abs/ (currently 39 of 50
signatories needed for entry into force) and its precursor, the 2000 Bonn Guidelines on Access to
Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Conference of the
Parties (COP), Decision VI/24 A (2002) [hereinafter “the Bonn Guidelines].
55. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles of Global Consensus
on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Doc.
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Convention.56
The famous Article 8(j) of the CBD is perhaps the single most important
provision on indigenous knowledge in a substantive international
environmental treaty. That Article has foisted progressive and practical
strategies for the realization of indigenous peoples’ rights to their knowledge
through access and benefit sharing (ABS), and the migration of these rights into
other regimes, notably IPRs and plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
(PGRFA). The promotion of farmers’ rights as an integral aspect of indigenous
knowledge under the PGRFA predates the CBD.57 However, the CBD,
especially its ABS principles and programs, inspired the principal treaty on
farmers’ rights; The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture.58 The CBD is the framework instrument for the 2010 Nagoya
Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing,59 which reflects the highpoint of
Convention’s work on indigenous knowledge.
Other substantive treaty instruments relevant to aspects of indigenous
peoples’ rights include: the International Covenant on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination;60 the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women;61 and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.62 Jointly and severally, these instruments focus on discrimination,
and the vulnerability of women and children. As the most destitute members

A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III) (Aug. 14, 1992).
56. See, e.g., The Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Oct. 14, 1994, Sen. Treat. Doc. No. 10429, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3.
57. The PGRFA has its roots in the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture, which resulted from FAO Conference Resolution 8/83. Food and
Agricultural Organization, Comm. on Genetic Res. for Food and Agric., International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Res. 8/83, FAO Doc. CPGR/87/Inf.3, (August,
1983), available at http://www.fao.org/ag//CGRFA/iu.htm.
58. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, available
at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf [hereinafter ITPGRFA]. Article 1.1 of the
ITPGRFA provides: “The objectives of this Treaty are the conservation and sustainable use of plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out
of their use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and
food security.” Id. art 1.1.
59. See particularly preamblular sections of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/.
60. Int. Conv. on the Elim. of All Forms of Racial Discrim., 660 U.N.T.S. 212 (1969), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.html.
61. Conv. on the Elim. of All Forms of Discrim. of Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1981), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3970.html.
62. Conv. On the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (1990), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.
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of the human family, these themes resonate strongly with indigenous peoples,
especially indigenous women and children. It is instructive that the Committee
on the Rights of the Child has called attention on the implication of Convention
on the Rights of the Child on indigenous children in its general comment.63
3. Recent Developments – UNDRIP
Perhaps the most important instrument on indigenous peoples’ rights
generally, and from HRs perspective, is the 2007 UNDRIP.64 Despite its
doubtful status as a binding instrument, the document derives its significance
from a number of factors. First, it is most unlike any other “declaration” given
its long evolutionary process and unquestionable legitimacy as evidenced in the
robust participation of indigenous peoples in its making.65 Second, according
to James Anaya, the UNDRIP:
[D]oes not [necessarily] affirm or create special rights separate from the
fundamental human rights that are deemed of universal application, but
rather elaborates upon these fundamental rights in the specific cultural,
historical, social and economic circumstances of indigenous
peoples . . . [it] reflects the existing international consensus regarding
the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples . . . .66
Third, UNDRIP is the most comprehensive elaboration of indigenous
peoples’ rights in a single document. Consequently, it helps to capture the
scope and complexity of those rights at a glance. Fourth, it represents, in a
consolidated form, the climax of the attempts hitherto to locate and justify
peculiarly indigenous peoples’ rights outside the broader conventional HRs

63. See Conv. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 11 (2009), U.N. Doc. No.
CRC/C/GC/11 (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.GC.
C.11.pdf.
64. On the significance of UNDRIP, see Allen & Xanthaki, supra note 46; see also James
Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post Declaration Era, in
MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 184 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen, eds., 2009) [hereinafter Anaya
2009b].
65. See CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 82 (2006) (arguing
that “[UNDRIP’s] legitimacy is unimpeachable, given the highly participatory process that led to it”).
66. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶¶ 40, 43, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by S. James Anaya) (cited in HELFER & AUSTIN,
supra note 8, at 442 (emphasis added)); see also Anaya 2009b, supra note 64.
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frameworks.67 Fifth, being essentially a declaration, UNDRIP represents a
more effective and practical approach to indigenous rights than a new treaty
could possibly accomplish. Finally, the declaration represents a bold attempt
to put to rest the lingering historical controversy over the inchoate status of selfdetermination as it applies to indigenous peoples.
UNDRIP’s exceptional legal and historical status marks it out as a unique
instrument. There is no other document more qualified as the starting point for
distilling pivotal elements of indigenous peoples’ rights, especially those that
will assist in mapping them onto the intersection between HRs and IPR.
Without discounting the diverse range of rights under UNDRIP, we can identify
two of those rights from which all other rights issue. They are the right to selfdetermination,68 and the rights associated with knowledge and culture. The
latter are elaborated across the Declaration’s text69 and are associated with its
provision on IP.70 In a way, the rights to knowledge and culture are extensions
of the right to self-determination.
Self-determination is the chart with which to navigate indigenous peoples’
rights in their entire detail. It is “the most central human rights issue for
indigenous peoples.”71 As an aggregation of indigenous peoples’ rights, selfdetermination is one that comfortably situates within economic, social, and
cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. It exemplifies the
indivisibility of HRs.
The IBRs basically provide the legal foundation of the right to selfdetermination. The CESCR and the CCPR share an exact textual statement of
the right in their respective first Articles, which states: “All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”72 Self-determination is an enabling right, one that capacitates
the realization of every other promise of HRs. However, expressed that way,
self-determination may appear hollow, and runs the risk of representing
everything, but amounting to nothing. More meaningfully expressed, the

67. More than elaborating fundamental HRs in the specific cultural, historical, social and
economic contexts of indigenous peoples, the declaration also articulated specific indigenous claims
that are not accommodated within the fundamental HRs framework.
68. See Anaya 2009b, supra note 64.
69. See, e.g., UNDRIP, supra note 29, art. 5, 8(2), 9, 11–16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31.
70. See id. art. 31.
71. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 447; see also Anaya 2004, supra note 12, at 97 (noting
that no discussion of indigenous peoples’ rights under international law is complete without a
discussion of self-determination).
72. CESCR, supra note 31, art. 1 (emphasis added); CCPR, supra note 32, art. 1 (emphasis
added).
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fulcrum of HRs is the dignity and integrity of the human person for the
realization of their potential, made possible through the exercise of the right to
self-determination.
As noted earlier, despite the pre-eminence of self-determination in HRs
jurisprudence, indigenous peoples have remained equivocal candidates for the
full realization of the right. Because of the state-centred nature of the right to
self-determination, extending the right to indigenous peoples or populations
remained a matter of jurisprudential hair-splitting for a long time.73 As we have
noted, the ILO Convention 169 exemplifies the trepidation over extending the
right to self-determination to indigenous peoples. Hence, it shrouded the rights
in caveats. In contrast to the reluctance of preceding substantive and
interpretive documents on the issue of self-determination, the UNDRIP lays to
rest any lingering scepticism over the application of the right to selfdetermination to indigenous peoples. In Article 3, it reiterates exact textual
provisions of the right to self-determination borrowed from the CESCR and the
CCPR.74 The difference is that it unequivocally states that “indigenous peoples
have the right to self-determination.”75
In its provisions, the right to self-determination is designed to be translated
into the political, economic, social, and cultural development realms. As a
result, virtually all the provisions of CESCR, CCPR, even UNDRIP and other
HRs instruments are elaborations of the political, economic, social, and cultural
aspects of self-determination. Here are two examples: Article 27 of the CCPR
reads as follows: “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language.”76 Also, Article 20 of UNDRIP provides as follows: “[i]ndigenous
peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and
social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means
of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and
other economic activities.”77
IP, and specifically knowledge governance is “directly relevant to selfdetermination claims, in particular the cultural and technological, and economic
development of indigenous peoples.”78 A look at the provisions of UNDRIP

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Anaya 2004, supra note 12, at 100–103.
UNDRIP, supra note 29, art. 3.
Id.
CCPR, supra note 32, art. 27.
UNDRIP, supra note 29, art. 20.
See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 448.
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and, indeed, most of the international HRs instruments relevant to indigenous
peoples’ rights reveal a link between self-determination, and indigenous
knowledge and cultural practices and, by extension, an exposure of the latter to
the IP. In the next part, we synthesize the discourse on the convergence
between HRs and IPRs, and highlight the peripheral treatment of indigenous
peoples’ rights in that context.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
According to Helfer, the fairly recent engagement of HRs and IPRs is a
reactionary consequence of two developments. The first is the historical
negligence of the cultural rights of indigenous peoples.79 The second is the
linking of IP with trade via the TRIPS and TRIPS-plus agreements.80 One can
add a third reason, namely the continued expansion of both HRs and IPRs in
the last quarter of the twentieth century, which has resulted in their overlapping
interest in identical subject matters.81
On the first point, the 2007 UNDRIP and the 1995 Guidelines for the
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples82 resulted from the U.N. HRs
system’s bid to close the gap that the cultural rights of indigenous peoples posed
for IPRs.83 In regard to the second and third points, the WTO—through
TRIPS—now supervises an unprecedented trend of IPRs expansion by
extending the scope of IPRs coverage to all fields of technology.84 In the same

79. Id.
80. Laurence R. Helfer, International Rights Approaches to Intellectual Property: Toward a
Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 982 (2007)
[hereinafter HRs Framework]. TRIPs-plus refers to regional and various other forms of free trade
agreements with intellectual property standard that go beyond the TRIPS’ standard.
81. See Chidi Oguamanam, Intellectual Property: The Promise and Risk of Human Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 319: Interdisciplinary Approaches (B. Courtney
Doagoo et al., eds., 2013) [hereinafter Oguamanam 2013].
82. Special Rapporteur on the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, Comm. On
Human Rights, Subcomm. On Prev. of Discrm. & Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (Jun. 21, 1995) (by Erica-Irene Daes); see HRs Framework, supra note 80, at
983.
83. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 982–983. The raison d’être for UNDRIP goes beyond
IP. Indeed, the process that eventually resulted in the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples dates back to 1970s, some accounts even trace it to 1960s. It is part of the
broader struggle for the emancipation of indigenous peoples from colonialism through selfdetermination. It received greater impetus in the 1980s when the subjects of indigenous knowledge,
cultural heritage and intellectual property received more traction in the discourse of indigenous issues.
For insight, see Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 Eur. J. Int. Law 141 (2011).
84. TRIPS’ expansion of IPRs is captured under Article 27 which, among other things, provides
for patent rights on “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” TRIPS:

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

281

timeframe, public international law advances interpretative permissiveness of
economic, social, and cultural rights.85 As well, pressure by IPRs holders on
both political and economic scenes has resulted in regulatory capture of
important IPRs norm-creating bodies, including the WTO itself and the
WIPO.86
In terms of impacts, TRIPS and TRIPS-plus agreements have been linked
to setbacks in global progress in HRs.87 Given the ubiquity of IPRs in the global
social, economic, and cultural fabric, such setbacks pervade all facets of HRs.
In virtually every traditional HRs realm, notably the rights to health, access to
essential medicines, rights to food, education, information, freedom of
expression, and even the emergent right to development, IPRs appear to be on
trial. TRIPS is associated with escalating inequities between the global north
and south. As well, IPRs are perceived as the tools for freezing access to
knowledge,88 especially against those in direst need.
Eschewing elaborations of IPRs’ complicity in fuelling specific HRs
crises,89 our interest is in the conceptual tenor of those discussions. In that
regard, the relationship between HRs and IPRs is expressed from diverse
perspectives. The first thinking is that HRs are directly conflicted with IPRs.90
While HRs are essentially public rights, IPRs are for the most part private
rights, albeit heavily mediated by pubic regarding considerations. By their
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 21, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M 1197 (1994).
85. The consequences is that while various forms of innovations in the life sciences (such as
genes), with ramifications for pharmaceutical, food, agriculture and medicines, are subject of patents,
on the human rights front, the right to health, access to medicines and the rights to adequate food, as
well as the right to moral and material interest in intellectual creations are also being fleshed out
pursuant to the general comments on the CESCR. See generally CESCR, supra note 31.
86. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); see also PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002).
87. See generally Cynthia M. Ho, Current Controversies Surrounding Patent Rights and Public
Health in a World of International Norms, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 673 (Toshiko Takenaka, ed., 2008) [hereinafter Ho]; INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS (Tzen Wong &
Graham Dutfield, eds., 2011).
88. A caveat is necessary here to indicate that while the undisputed visibility of IP makes it a
flash point for the escalating HRs gaps in the areas of access to knowledge goods, there are many
factors that mediate access to knowledge and HRs beyond IPRs. For instance, while the patent regime
is complicit in regard to access to life saving medicines by the world’s neediest, factors such as political
corruption or inadequate infrastructure, to name the few, can also militate against access to essential
medicines, and other health care deliverables even when patent-related barriers are addressed.
89. See generally Grosheide Paradox, supra note 1; see also HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8.
90. Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Co-existence?, 22
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 167, 168 (2004) [hereinafter Conflict or Co-existence].

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

282

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

[Vol. 18:2

nature, public rights constrain or moderate private rights. The second is
premised on the compatibility of the objectives of HRs and IPRs, i.e., the
advancement of human capacity, welfare, and potential. In this conceptual
matrix, HRs and IPRs are mutually re-enforcing and therefore capable of coexistence.91
The third is more pragmatic. It does not see HRs and IPRs as exclusive
concepts. Rather, it recognizes that there are HRs and non-HRs aspects of
IPRs.92 Fourth—and closely related—is that IP can serve as an instrument to
foster the objectives of HRs. Fifth, (which is a converse of the third and still in
the instrumental realm), is that HRs considerations can be a check on unbridled
IPRs claims.93
Another tenable view is that IPRs jurisprudence has in-built capacity to
accommodate variegated HRs-friendly policy-oriented exceptions.94 This is a
euphemistic way of insisting that IPRs have inherent capacity to resolve the
ever-permanent question of balance between rights holders and those seeking
access to intellectual works.95 A well-negotiated balance between HRs and IP
mitigates the idea of conflict. Overall, HRs constitute a fairly new and
important, yet long neglected conceptual platform for negotiating the elusive
balance in IPRs.
The HRs regime is the first in time and the most proactive in engaging its
IPRs counterpart.96 The latter has been historically reluctant to engage HRs.97
As such, IPRs have yet to demonstrate an understanding of their relationship
with HRs. IPRs’ chilling attitude to HRs reflects the gaps in the former’s modus
91. See Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual
Property?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268 (2004); see also Grosheide
Introduction, supra note 2, at 22–23.
92. Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 710–11 (2007) [hereinafter Ten Questions].
93. Groesheide Introduction, supra note 2, at 22–23.
94. See generally Ysolde Gendreau, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Canada, in
COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRIVACY 21
(Paul L.C. Torremans, ed. 2004).
95. At national level, the prospects of the legal system negotiating this balance toward positive
outcome for users of intellectual works is higher in relation to the international level where states’
obligations to international agreements are easily undermined by claims to sovereignty. Also, at
international level, asymmetrical power relations and negotiating leverage between technological
strong countries and their less endowed counterparts are more pronounced than the prevailing
dynamics at national levels. See Wendy J. Gordon, Do we have a Right to Speak with Another’s
Language? Eldred and the Duration of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRIVACY 109 (Paul L.C. Torremans, ed. 2004).
96. See Conflict and Co-existence, supra note 90.
97. There is no reference to HRs in major international intellectual property agreements,
including the Berne and Paris Conventions as well as the TRIPS Agreement. The converse is true in
regards to the UNDHR and the CESCR.

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

283

operandi. A major challenge in the HRs-IPRs discourse is to fill those gaps so
that IPRs, in the words of Drahos, can accommodate the “interests and needs
that it currently does not.”98
The ongoing rapprochement that the HRs system is making on IPRs is not
without results. There are two important illustrations of gestational attempts to
map HRs framework for IPRs. One is through the general HRs system of the
U.N. The other is through the more focused interpretative process of the
CESCR. The first initiative was animated by public health crisis perceived to
have been aggravated by TRIPS.99 For the most part, the other is both a
response to the first as well as an incidence of the efforts toward progressive
realization of economic, social, and cultural rights of the IBRs. We focus more
on the economic, social, and cultural rights categories because of their
implication for indigenous peoples’ rights.
First, insisting on the primacy of HRs over IP,100 the U.N. HRs system
capitalized on TRIPS negative outcomes, especially in the area of health in
developing countries, to stoke tensions between trade-based orientation to IPRs
and HRs, especially the right to health. This approach was initiated in 2000
through Resolution 2000/7 of the Sub-Commission on the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights (the Sub-Commission).101 Titled Intellectual
Property and Human Rights102 the resolution was, in way, a bold attack on
TRIPS’ negative effects on aspects of HRs. That perception quickly spread to
other key U.N. bodies.103 A combination of events during the early 2000s
resulted in a perfect alignment of circumstances and opportunities around the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, which marked a period of concerted pressure and
resistance to TRIPS across regimes.104
For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) was instrumental to
98. See Grosheide Introduction, supra note 2, at 22 (quoting World Intellectual Property
Organization [WIPO], The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Developments, at 25,
WIPO-UNHCHR/IP/PNL/98/1 (Oct. 28, 1998) (by Peter Drahos)).
99. See IP in Global Governance, supra note 52, at 87–91; see also Ho, supra note 87.
100. See Intellectual Property Rights and Human rights, U.N. High Comm. for Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res.2000/7, 52nd Sess., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7
(August 17, 2000) (Adopted without a vote).
101. Comm. Hum. Rts., 25th Sess., Res. 2000/7, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/subcom.htm (May
15, 2014).
102. Intellectual Property Rights and Human rights, U.N. High Comm. for Human Rights, SubCommission on Human Rights, Res.2000/7, 52nd Sess., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7 (August
17, 2000) (Adopted without a vote).
103. See IP in Global Governance, supra note 52, at 87–88.
104. Resolution 2000/7 articulated the scope of HRs crisis posed by IP in many contexts,
including technology transfer, right to food, genetic resources, access to patented medicines and the
exploitation of the indigenous knowledge.
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the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health.105 That declaration forced a hurried but failed attempt to “retouch”
TRIPS with a compassionate primer in response to a dire humanitarian and
public health crisis it was perceived to have escalated. WHO’s efforts were
complemented by emboldened new actors in global health governance
committed to addressing pharmaceutical R&D gaps in poor peoples’ disease
and the problem of patent-driven access freezes to essential medicines at a time
when the world faced a global health crisis of historic proportion.106 Not only
did the U.N. HRs system insist upon the primacy of HRs over IP, it committed
to deepen the understanding of the relationship between HRs and IPRs through,
among other things, commissioned studies and reports. Perhaps more
important, it sought to participate or have observer status in important IPRs
policy making fora, such as the WTO and the WIPO-IGC.107
The efforts under the auspices of the U.N. HRs system to promote
normative primacy of HRs over IPRs lacked legal force for a number of
reasons.108 First, resolutions of the Sub-Commission are not binding.109
Second, the Sub-Commission’s claim that TRIPS violates HRs has yet to be
rigorously scrutinized through the rules of customary international law.110
Third, along with other initiatives that have promoted the primacy of HRs over
IPRs, the Sub-Commission’s efforts do not provide textual analysis of HRs
framework for IPRs.111 In short, claims of HRs supremacy over IPRs appear
not directly supported by core HRs instruments or principles of customary
international law.112
Despite the legal weaknesses of the initiatives of the UN HRs systems,

105. Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Y. J. INT’L L. 2 (2004).
106. See Ho, supra note 87; Taiwo A. Oriola, Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy
Challenges for Managing Neglected Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drugs, 7 CAN. J. L. &
TECH. 57 (2009); Chidi Oguamanam, Patents and Pharmaceutical R&D: Consolidating PrivatePublic Partnership Approach to Global Public Health Crises, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 556 (2010).
107. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 987.
108. Id. at 985–986.
109. Id. at 985.
110. Id. at 985–86.
111. Id.
112. According to Yu, two forms of conflict are activated by IP and HRs. One is external and
the other internal. In regard to external conflict, we need to first distinguish non-human rights aspects
of IP. As to internal conflict which exists within the HRs paradigm, he argues, “the principle of human
rights primacy is inapplicable, because all the conflicting rights have a human rights basis.” See Ten
Questions, supra note 92, at 711–12. This Author hesitates to entirely dispense with the human right
primacy in the context of internal conflict, especially given the interpretative trend of the CESCR. See
GC 17, infra note 118, ¶ 1. However, the problem with a primacy approach is that it has to provide a
response to the concept of indivisibility of HRs.
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Resolution 2000/7 represents an “ambitious new agenda for reviewing
intellectual property issues within the U.N. human rights system, an agenda
animated by the basic principle of human rights primacy.”113 But the rather
belated task of attempting a textual elaboration of HRs framework for IPRs fell
on the CESCR via its GCs, which have, essentially, advisory status.
In 2001, the Committee issued a statement on HRs and IP114 in an attempt
to “identify some of the key human rights principles deriving from the
Covenant that are required to be taken into account in the development,
interpretation and implementation of contemporary intellectual property
regimes.”115 Though subject to progressive refinement,116 the statement
provided the foundation for the Committee’s current and long term interest in
the exploration of IPRs from HRs perspectives. The Committee identified ten
cardinal HRs principles pursuant to the Covenant to guide the elaboration of
IPRs.117
In accordance with the 2001 statement of principles the Committee issued,
in 2005, GC No. 17 (Article 15(1)(c)).118 The Article in question deals with
authors’ right. It is the key Covenant provision with perhaps the most direct
relevance to IPRs. It provides as follows: “The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone . . . [t]o benefit from the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.”119
Without delving into the elaborate interpretative details of the GC120 on the
above deceptively simple provision of the Covenant, a highlight of its important
contributions to the textual elements of Article 15(1)(c) is helpful. First, the
GC notes that despite the narrowness of the language of Article 15(1)(c) that
identifies authors to be natural persons only, “[the authors] could also be groups
of individuals.”121 Similarly, despite the emphasis of Article 15(1) on

113. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 986.
114. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Social & Cultural Rights, Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001).
115. Id. ¶ 2.
116. Id.
117. They are universality, indivisibility, interdependence, equality, non-discrimination,
participation, accountability, general legal obligations, core obligations, international cooperation and
assistance. The Statement indicates that these principles are essentially basic and not exhaustive.
118. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 17 (2005), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter GC 17]; see Hans
Morten Haugen, General Comment 17 on “Authors’ Rights”, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 53 (2007).
119. CESCR, supra note 31, art. 15(1)(c).
120. They are contained in a 17 page document spanning 57 paragraphs.
121. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 7.
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individual creators as beneficiaries of moral rights (protection of moral and
materials interest), “under certain circumstances,” the GC notes, such rights,
can “also be enjoyed by groups of individuals or by communities.”122 It further
remarks that even though legal entities are recognized holders of IP, “their
entitlements [to IPRs], because of their different nature, are not protected at the
level of human rights.”123
The GC douses the apparent bias of Article 15(c) for authors as opposed to
inventors and other categories of innovators outside the authorial realm.124
Perhaps more important, it breaks the textual silence of the Covenant on
indigenous peoples. It clarifies that reference to “scientific, literary or artistic
production” encompasses “creations of the human mind, that is to ‘scientific
productions’, such as scientific publication and innovations, including
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities . . .
performances and oral traditions.”125 The GC notes that the modality to protect
moral and material interests need not equate with those obtained under
conventional IPRs so long as such interests can be protected by other means.126
Referring to “moral interest,” the GC acknowledges that moral rights
protect the intrinsic personal character of every creation of the human mind as
an extension of a creator’s personality, toward sustaining “the durable link
between creators and their creations.”127 Given the recognition of group rights,
this view fits perfectly within the immemorial link between indigenous peoples
and their knowledge systems. On “material interest,” the GC identifies a
parallel between this right and property rights and the right of workers to
adequate remuneration pursuant to UNDHR and Article 7(a) of CESCR. It
notes that as opposed to other HRs categories, material interests have no link to
author’s personality but they assist to realize the enjoyment of the right to an
adequate standard of living. Shifting the rights from conventional HRs, the GC
notes that the term of protection of authors’ right on the basis of material
interest may not be premised on the lifespan of an author. What is important is
a remuneration scheme that enables authors to enjoy adequate standard of
122. Id. ¶ 8. An example of the practical implication of this can be found in the famous
Australian cases of Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 130 ALR 659 (Austl.) and Yumbulul v
Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 IPR 481 (Austl.). Furthermore, Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles
Pty. Ltd. (1998) 157 ALR 193 (Austl.), provides a judicial perspective on Aboriginal communal
interest in copyright, and by extension intellectual property.
123. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 7.
124. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox?, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 72 (Grosheide ed., 2010) (underlining
the modest ramification of Article 15(1)(c) for inventors). But see Ten Questions, supra note 92.
125. GC 17, supra note 118, at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
126. Id. ¶ 10.
127. Id. ¶ 12.
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living. While this fits within indigenous peoples’ expectation from the IPRs
system, unlike the GC’s position on moral rights, it conflicts with the
immemorial tenor of traditional knowledge.
In elaborating the principle of general legal obligations of states on HRs,
the GC reiterates the notion of progressive obligation. It notes that like all other
HRs, the rights under Article 15(1)(c) impose three levels of obligations on
state parties, namely to respect, protect and fulfil.128
Under the consideration of principles of special legal and related
obligations,129 the GC makes two important observations that have
ramifications for indigenous peoples’ rights. They deserve recalling in extenso:
States parties should adopt measures to ensure the effective protection
of the interests of indigenous peoples relating to their productions,
which are often expressions of their cultural heritage and traditional
knowledge. In adopting measures to protect scientific, literary and
artistic productions of indigenous peoples, States parties should take
into account their preferences. Such protection might include the
adoption of measures to recognize, register and protect the individual
or collective authorship of indigenous peoples under national
intellectual property rights regimes and should prevent the unauthorized
use of scientific, literary and artistic productions of indigenous peoples
by third parties. In implementing these protection measures, States
parties should respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent
of the indigenous authors concerned and the oral or other customary
forms of transmission of scientific, literary or artistic production; where
appropriate, they should provide for the collective administration by
indigenous peoples of the benefits derived from their productions.130
The GC recognizes that the provisos of Article 15(1)(c) ought to be viewed
in relation to other rights recognized under the Covenant. It insists that for the
realization of full range of rights, parties must strike “adequate balance”
between rights under that Article and other Covenant provisions.131 Hence:
“[i]n striking this balance, the private interests of authors should not be unduly
favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access to their productions

128. Id. ¶ 28.
129. These are further amplifications of the principles set out under the Statement on Human
Rights and Intellectual Property. The one refers to obligation that are special to given provision or
subject matter while the other refers to obligations that have related application to other rights
recognized under the Covenant.
130. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 32.
131. Id. ¶¶ 35, 40(e).
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should be given due consideration.”132
Continuing, the GC observes further:
Ultimately, intellectual property is a social product and has a social
function. States parties thus have a duty to prevent unreasonably high
costs for access to essential medicines, plant seeds or other means of
food production, or for schoolbooks and learning materials, from
undermining the rights of large segments of the population to health,
food and education. Moreover, States parties should prevent the use of
scientific and technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights
and dignity, including the rights to life, health and privacy, e.g. by
excluding
inventions
from
patentability
whenever
their
commercialization would jeopardize the full realization of these rights.
States parties should, in particular, consider to what extent the patenting
of the human body and its parts would affect their obligations under the
Covenant or under other relevant international human rights
instruments.133
On a balance, it would seem that the approach adopted by the GC embraces
both a conflict and a complementary model. It, however, leaves the impression
that the prevailing relationship between HRs and IPRs is conflict-driven,
without disclaiming the potential for HRs complementary framework for IPRs.
Setting the tone for its approach, the GC points out that Article 15(1)(c) rights,
like other HRs, are distinct from most legal entitlements incidental to IP and
should not be equated with them.134 It distinguishes IPRs from HRs as follows:
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements
belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of
individuals and communities. Human rights are fundamental as they
are inherent to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property
rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to provide
incentives for inventiveness and creativity . . . . [Unlike human rights]
intellectual property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can
be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else.135
The significance of GC No.17 is not diminished by its status as a nonbinding advisory opinion. Rather, it is a major attempt under normative

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. ¶ 35 (footnotes omitted).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
Id.
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international HRs jurisprudence to explore the HRs-IP intersection, and appears
to have set the tone on this important subject. GC No. 17 deals directly with
just a sub-section of Article 15.136 It is essentially the most preliminary of what
promises to be a long-term work for the CESCR.
In addition, by adopting the principles of related obligations, universality,
indivisibility, and interdependence of HRs,137 the scope of the GC No. 17 is not
limited to Article 15(1)(c), but includes other aspects of the Covenant.
Subsequent GC, such as No. 21 (2009) on the rights of everyone to take part in
cultural life (Article 15(1)(a)) re-echoes the sentiments enunciated under GC
No. 17. Unless there is a radical change in orientation of the Committee, its
future elaborations relevant to HRs and IPRs could be fairly predictable.138
The belated interest of the Committee on the issues of HRs and IPRs raises
some concern in terms of cohesion and scope. Before 2001 when the
Committee issued the HRs principles for exploring IPRs, it is not clear to what
extent its previous GCs, for example, GC Nos. 12 and 13—right to adequate
food (art 11) and right to education (art 13) of 1999—took those principles into
account. Undoubtedly, food and education are sites for innovation and
creativity pursuant to “scientific, literary and artistic production.”
In contrast, there is remarkable synergy in the language and in the proactive
engagement with HRs and IPRs in GC Nos. 17 and 21 (right to benefit from
moral and material interest)—15(1)(c) and (right to take part in cultural life)—
15(1)(a)) respectively. This is not necessarily because of the location of these
rights in the same Article text. Rather, both build upon the 2001 key HRs
principles for the interpretation of IPRs regimes.139 Notably, there is growing
recognition of indigenous peoples in the post-2001 GC as a group requiring
special protection. Also, remarkable is the increased recognition of the
collective and communal nature of indigenous peoples’ rights.140
From the above outlook on the tenor of the HRs interface with IPRs, some
observations are pertinent. Indigenous peoples’ rights as HRs are barely
recognized in the core international HRs instruments, and are not the subject of

136. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 21, Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter GC 21].
137. See supra note 118.
138. Presently, there is no GC on the right to enjoy the benefit of scientific progress. It is
expected that any such GC would build on the framework of the post 2001 GCs and would give
reasonable accommodation to indigenous peoples and their knowledge system.
139. The general text, scope and interpretive framework of these two documents are influenced
by the 2001 general principles.
140. See, e.g., GC 21, supra note 136, ¶¶ 7, 9, 16(e), 36, 37; see also GC 17, supra note 118, ¶
32.
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direct references across diverse HRs instruments.141 Indeed, “[w]hen the
UDHR and the ICESCR were drafted, the drafters did not have indigenous
groups and traditional communities in mind.”142 Textual accommodation or
dedicated references to indigenous peoples’ rights appear in secondary
interpretive HRs instruments, notably the work of the Committee, especially in
the context of its belated interest in HRs and IPRs. Even then, the Committee’s
pre-2001 GCs were not issued with the same level of consciousness over the
rapprochement between HRs and IPRs.
On its face, there is a paradoxical undertone in regard to indigenous
peoples’ rights within the IP-HRs interface. While indigenous peoples’ rights
can be potentially impacted in negative ways by the boomerang effect of HRs
ratchet of IP,143 “the use of human rights regime may even alleviate the existing
bias against those performing intellectual labour outside the Western model.”144
And yet, indigenous HRs have yet to be fully integrated onto the normative core
of international HRs jurisprudence. The pivotal aspect of indigenous rights,
namely the right to self-determination remains a right in a state of continuing
negotiation over the detail of its application to indigenous peoples. The preeminence of the UNDRIP and its dedication to indigenous-specific HRs issues
does not necessarily dispense with the need to justify indigenous groups or
collective rights claims via a vis the individual thrust of HRs. That then
provides the starting point in the next section for exploring the difficulties that
arise in trying to configure indigenous rights at the intersection of HRs and
IPRs.
III. MAPPING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS ONTO HRS-IPRS INTERFACE
Attempts to locate indigenous rights at the intersection of HRs and IPRs
readily unveil the root of indigenous peoples disadvantage in both domains.
This foundational negligence is at the heart of both the desperation to embrace,
and trepidation to abhor, which depicts the dialectics of indigenous peoples’
response to both IPRs and HRs. Fitting the communal and collective nature of
indigenous socio-cultural dynamics and their knowledge production processes
within two individual-centred regimes is an inherently knotty endeavour. It
evokes all the tractions of discrimination and exclusion that indigenous peoples
endure in the colonization project as outliers in western legal traditions.
Because HRs and IPRs share a unity of focus on the individual, the
collective character of indigenous rights remains alien to the two legal regimes.
141.
142.
143.
144.

This was the situation before the adoption on UNDRIP in 2007.
Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 740.
See Oguamanam 2013, supra note 81.
Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 744.
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However, the expansive character of HRs supports their extension to groups.145
Indigenous rights are subtly distinguished as a group right of collective nature
as opposed to one of corporate nature. According to Peter Jones, conceived as
corporate rights, group rights, cannot be represented as HRs. But conceived as
collective rights, it is possible to represent such rights “either as human rights
or as closely akin to human rights.”146 Unlike collective rights, “corporate
conception accords groups a status that is ultimate rather than derivative” from
rights of individual members of the collective.147
Understood as collective rights, indigenous peoples’ rights are immune
from the traditional objections against group rights in HRs jurisprudence.
Collective rights do not ascribe a morally distinct or significant identity to a
group that is separate from its individual members.148 Unlike corporate rights,
group rights are not a licence to oppress. They do not subsume the rights of
their individual members. They are not necessarily exclusionary in regard to
other human beings. Rather, “[a] collective right will be eligible for
consideration as a human right, or for membership in the same moral family as
human rights, only if it is a right that we can ascribe universally to human
beings and that rests upon their moral status as human beings.”149 This nuance
in the nature of indigenous rights as group rights may have informed the firm
but controversial preference of indigenous over corporate right holders for
protection in Article 15(1)(c) of the Covenant pursuant to GC No.17.
Another challenge that arises in locating indigenous peoples’ rights at the
intersection of IPRs and HRs is a carryover from the HRs and IP debate. Just
as not all IPRs warrant consideration as HRs,150 not all indigenous rights are
HRs. The ubiquitous nature of self-determination as an amorphous aggregation
of indigenous rights runs the potential and real risk of cooptation of all forms
of indigenous rights, including indigenous knowledge into the HRs rhetoric.
Along similar lines, referring to the broader HRs jurisprudence, Helfer warns
that “[w]ithout greater normative clarity, however, such ‘rights talk’ risks
creating a legal environment in which every claim (and therefore no claim)

145. See id. at 741 (arguing that “human rights instruments contain considerable language that
allows one to explore collective rights.”).
146. Jones, supra note 6, at 88; see Geoff Gilbert, Individuals, Collectives and Rights, in
MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PATRICK THORNBERRY
148 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds., 2005); see also Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights,
13 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1991).
147. Jones, supra note 6, at 92.
148. Id. at 88.
149. Id. at 88–89.
150. Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 727.
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enjoys the distinctive protections that attach to human rights.”151
The same temptation is true in regard to the collective nature of indigenous
rights explored above. The fact that a right has a collective status does not
necessarily make it a HR.152 According to Peter Yu, one of the potential
dangers of HRs rhetoric in the IP arena is corporate hijack of IP protection via
HRs claims.153 He warns that “[s]uch development would exacerbate the
already severe imbalance in the existing intellectual property rights system and
would ultimately backfire on those who seek to use the human rights forum to
enrich the public domain and to set maximum limits of intellectual property
protection . . . .”154
The dangers of HRs rhetoric, especially in regard to indigenous knowledge
are manifold. Because of the primacy of HRs, there would be very marginal
room for regulatory intervention in order to balance real public regarding
conflicts.155 Such consideration would include access to knowledge, and
scrutiny of cultural practices that may be in conflict with other HRs. The
outcome would be one in which indigenous knowledge is protected beyond the
dictates of balance, scrutiny156 and critical reflection.157 Also, in a HRs ratchet
of IPRs, indigenous peoples are in a weaker position to match corporate
stakeholders in a running contest that has the potential of “a zero-sum game.”158
In a reference to authors’ rights as HRs (which can be extrapolated to
indigenous knowledge), Helfer notes that the trend of using HRs to expand
IPRs has the potential to embolden:
[I]ndustries and interest groups that rely upon intellectual property for
their economic well-being [to] invoke the authors’ rights and property
rights provisions in human rights treaties to further augment existing
151. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 976.
152. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (2nd
ed. 2003) (noting that “[c]ollectivities of all sorts have many and varied rights. But these are not—
cannot be—human rights, unless we substantially recast the concept”) (quoted in Ten Questions, supra
note 92, at 730 n.73).
153. See Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights
Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1112–13 (2007).
154. Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 738.
155. See HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 994.
156. Id. at 996–97.
157. Indigenous peoples are not disposed to setting term limit to their knowledge forms which
is perceived as immemorial, trans-generational and ongoing. This orientation is in conflict with term
limit under conventional intellectual property.
158. See Dreyfuss, supra note 124, at 90 (observing that “by framing the issues as a battle
among [corporate and indigenous] rights holders, this discourse promotes an adversarial perspective,
where rights are construed as inuring to one group’s benefit over another’s, and the system as a whole
is viewed a zero-sum game”).
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standards of protection. The fear of such expansions helps to explain
why some commentators are skeptical of attempts to analyze
intellectual property issues in human rights terms.159
Not all indigenous claims regarding IPRs or indigenous knowledge are
necessarily HRs claim. In locating indigenous knowledge within the
intersection of HRs and IPRs, it is important to identify the extent or
circumstance in which indigenous claims may be located on HRs platform and
when they fit within the instrumentalist economic rights of IP.160 GC No.17
(Art 15(1)(c) is clear that the scope of the protection of rights recognized therein
“does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to as intellectual property
rights under national legislation or international agreements.”161 It advises
against equating IPRs with the HRs recognized under that Article.162
Some rights, such as authors’ rights may have, on the surface, the attributes
of both HRs and IPRs. It is helpful therefore that in addition to identifying the
attributes of the right in question, a crucial issue is to determine the status of
rights’ claimants. When the rights claimants are technically the narrow
category recognized as indigenous in international law, such claims whether
presented as indigenous knowledge or IPRs are more likely to have a HRs
ramification. This is because given the precarious nature of indigenous
peoples’ civilizations and the extant threat to their cultural survival, the
instrumental economic logic comes secondary to the urgency to deploy their
knowledge and culture to salvage their vanishing identities, individual and
collective integrity and self-determination.163 On the other hand, other
categories of rights claimants who are technically not indigenous and who are
not faced with dire HRs crisis and threats to cultural survival are more likely to
stake their claims to knowledge on the instrumental economic logic of IPRs.164
The last major issue that saddle indigenous peoples right at the intersection
of HRs and IP arises from the dialectic of HRs and IPRs, which has a spillover
effect on indigenous rights. On their merits, without reference to indigenous
peoples’ rights, HRs and IP have a mutually re-enforcing and yet paradoxical
relationship. The one is capable of undermining and re-enforcing the other.

159. HRs Framework, supra 80, at 1015.
160. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 475.
161. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 2.
162. Id. ¶ 3.
163. Chidi Oguamanam, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge in International Law: Solidarity
Beyond the Nation-State, 8 L. TEXT CULTURE 191, 213-14 (2004); Oguamanam 2008, supra note 9, at
39–40.
164. Right claimants in this category are mostly local communities in the non-enclave
territories of the present day global south.
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While HRs framework is capable of bolstering indigenous rights, especially
indigenous knowledge, the latter is unlikely to fare better under HRs ratchet.
Not many would disagree that those claims are still at the periphery of HRs,
and recent attempts in HRs jurisprudence to accommodate indigenous
knowledge are at their very early stage.165 Inevitably, they are being elaborated
on ad hoc basis. As such, they are hardly capable of bridging the dichotomous
theoretical and philosophical foundations of indigenous peoples’ rights and
HRs.
On IPRs, indigenous rights claimants are fully conscious of IPRs’ doubleedged nature, especially in the context of indigenous knowledge. IP has the
ability to serve the ends of economic empowerment for indigenous knowledge
holders. Yet, it potentially represents a threat to cultural survival because of its
reductionist inclination to weigh creativity and cultural production on narrow
scale of economic or market values.166 Not to mention its overall disdain for
indigenous knowledge as unowned knowledge, devoid of intellectual ingenuity.
In a critical appraisal of the dialectical relationship between IP and indigenous
knowledge, it has been observed that “[i]ndigenous and local communities . . .
have a complex relationship with the intellectual property system. From
suspicion and trepidation, they engage that system reluctantly, but often
proactively . . . . [and] [l]ike the ‘dialectics of the colonized mind,’ indigenous
peoples’ attitude toward intellectual property reflects both admiration, and
disaffection or resistance.”167
For example, indigenous peoples oppose IP expansion in the realm of health
and essential medicines, and in the appropriation of intangible cultural
knowledge and expression of folklore. On the other hand, they are not averse
to the use of IP to protect their knowledge systems, especially in the realm of
biodiversity or bio-cultural knowledge, including farmers’ rights and placebased innovation or forms of geographical indications.168
This complex dialectical approach to IP by indigenous rights holders is
even affirmed in the two important documents on indigenous rights, the
UNDRIP and the Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage
of Indigenous Peoples.169 While these documents encourage traditional

165. See generally, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT (Peter Drahos and Susy Frankle, eds., 2012).
166. See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997).
167. See Chidi Oguamanam, Patents and Traditional Medicine: Digital Capture, Creative
Legal Intervention, and the Dialectics of Knowledge Transformation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
489, 490 (2008).
168. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 297–98 (2006).
169. Special Rapporteur on the Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Protection of the

OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/23/2014 1:37 PM

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

295

knowledge within existing IPRs paradigms, their approach to protectable
subject matters transcend the IP system.170 Along these line, Helfer notes that
“a human rights-inspired analysis of traditional knowledge views intellectual
property as one of the problems facing indigenous communities, and only
perhaps, as part of the solution to those problems.”171
CONCLUSION
Extant exploration of the interface between HRs and IP focuses on
conventional HRs categories. The extent to which these categories include
indigenous peoples’ rights remains inchoate. Unexpectedly, the historical and
jurisprudential orientation of both HRs and IPRs on individual as opposed to
group rights does not dispose them to engage fully with indigenous peoples’
rights, including their knowledge systems. Consequently, HRs-IPRs interface
inevitably exposes the roots of the historical challenge, which the indigenous
question poses for the colonial western legal tradition.
Yet, HRs-IP interface presents a unique opportunity for revisiting the gaps
in both HRs and IP jurisprudence on account of indigenous peoples’ rights. In
a counterintuitive way, as both a negotiating process and its outcome HRs
encounter with IP can be measured meaningfully by focusing on its
ramification for indigenous peoples as the most vulnerable members of the
human family. After all, “the realization of human rights must be judged
according to the level of implementation among the most disadvantaged.”172 A
critical understanding in both historical and contemporary contexts of the
nature and evolution of the rights of indigenous peoples is necessary. In the
least, such understanding is a foundational matter to make the case that no
meaningful discourse of HRs-IP interface is possible without engaging the
rights of indigenous peoples.

Heritage of Indigenous People, Comm. On Human Rights, Subcomm. On Prev. of Discr. & Prot. Of
Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (Jun. 21, 1995) (by Erica-Irene Daes); see also HRs
Framework, supra note 80, at 984; HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 450.
170. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 984.
171. Id.
172. Cullet, supra note 21, at 417.

